Abstract. We derive a Prolog theorem prover for an Intuitionistic Epistemic Logic by starting from the sequent calculus G4IP that we extend with operator definitions providing an embedding in intuitionistic propositional logic (IPC). With help of a candidate definition formula generator, we discover epistemic operators for which axioms and theorems of Artemov and Protopopescu's Intuitionistic Epistemic Logic (IEL) hold and formulas expected to be non-theorems fail. We compare the embedding of IEL in IPC with a similarly discovered successful embedding of Dosen's double negation modality, judged inadequate as an epistemic operator. Finally, we discuss the failure of the necessitation rule for an otherwise successful S4 embedding and share our thoughts about the intuitions explaining these differences between epistemic and alethic modalities in the context of the Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov semantics of intuitionistic reasoning and knowledge acquisition.
Introduction
Epistemic Logic Systems have been derived often in parallel and sometime as afterthoughts of alethic Modal Logic Systems, in which modalities are defined by axioms and additional inference rules extending classical logic.
With the advent of Answer Set Programming (ASP) epistemic logics hosted in this framework like e.g., [1, 2, 3] show that intermediate logics 1 can express epistemic operators by extending the underlying logic with definition of epistemic operators.
Steps 2 further below classical logic or ASP are taken in recent work [4] , based on the the Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov (BHK) view of intuitionistic logic that takes into account the constructive nature of knowledge, modeling more accurately the connection between proof systems and the related mental processes.
Along these lines, our inquiry into epistemic logic will focus on knowledge vs. truth seen as intuitionistic provability.
Like in the case of embedding epistemic operators into ASP systems, but with a "machine-learning" twist, we will design a synthesis mechanism for epistemic operators via embedding in IPC. For this purpose we will generate candidate formulas that verify axioms, theorems and rules and fail on expected non-theorems. We will also show that this view generalizes to a to a mechanism for discovering the right formalization of a given modal logic.
Our starting point is Artemov and Protopopescu's Intuitionistic Epistemic Logic (IEL) [4] that will provide the axioms, theorems and non-theorems stating the requirements that must hold for the definitions extending IPC. The discovery mechanism will also bring up Dosen's interpretation of double negation [5] as a potential epistemic operator and we will look into applying the same discovery mechanisms to find an embedding of modal logic S4 in IPC, with special focus on the impact of the necessitation rule, which requires that all theorems of the logic are necessarily true.
The the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 overviews Artemov and Protopopescu's Intuitionistic Epistemic Logic (IEL). Section 3 introduces the G4IP sequent calculus prover for Intuitionistic Propositional Logic (IPC). Section 4 describes the generator for candidate formulas extending IPC with modal operator definitions. Section 5 explains the discovering of the definitions that ensure the embedding of IEL into IPC and the discovering of the embedding of Dosen's double negation as a modality operator. Section 6 studies the case of the S4 modal logic and the failure of the necessity rule, indicating the difficulty of embedding it in IPC by contrast to IEL. Section 7 discusses the intuitions behind the embedding of IEL, including the epistemic equivalent of the necessity rule in IPC and the adequacy of this embedding as a constructive mechanism for reasoning about knowledge. Section 8 overviews some related work and section 9 concludes the paper.
The paper is written as a literate SWI-Prolog program with its extracted code at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ptarau/TypesAndProofs/master/ieltp.pro.
Overview of Artemov and Protopopescu's IEL logic
In [4] a system for Epistemic Intuitionistic Logic is introduced that "maintains the original Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov semantics for intuitionism and is consistent with the well-known approach that intuitionistic knowledge be regarded as the result of verification".
Instead of the classic, alethic-modalities inspired K operator for which KA → A Artemov and Protopopescu argue that co-reflection expresses better the idea of constructivity of truth A → KA They also argue that this applies to both belief and knowledge i.e., that "The verification-based approach allows that justifications more general than proof can be adequate for belief and knowledge".
On the other hand, they consider intuitionistic reflection acceptable, expressing the fact that "known propositions cannot be false":
KA → ¬¬A Thus, they position intuitionistic knowledge of A between A and ¬¬A:
A → KA → ¬¬A and given that via Glivenko's transformation [6] applying double negation to a formula embeds classical propositional calculus into IPC, they express this view as:
Intuitionistic Truth ⇒ Intuitionistic Knowledge ⇒ Classical Truth.
They axiomatize the system IEL as follows.
1. Axioms of propositional intuitionistic logic;
They also argue that a weaker logic of belief (IEL − ) is expressed by considering only axioms 1,2,3.
The G4ip prover for IPC
We will describe next our lightweight propositional intuitionistic theorem prover, that will be used to discover an embedding of EIL into IPC.
The LJT/G4ip calculus, (restricted here to the implicational fragment)
Motivated by problems related to loop avoidance in implementing Gentzen's LJ calculus, Roy Dyckhoff [7] introduces the following rules for the G4ip calculus 3 .
The rules work with the context Γ being either a multiset or a set.
For supporting negation, one also needs to add LJT 5 that deals with the special term f alse. Then negation of A is defined as A → f alse.
LJT 5 : f alse,Γ G Rules for conjunction, disjunction and bi-conditional (not shown here) are also part of the calculus.
As it is not unusual with logic formalisms, the same calculus had been discovered independently in the 50's by Vorob'ev and in the 80's-90's by Hudelmaier [8, 9] .
A Lightweight Theorem Prover for Intuitionistic Propositional Logic
Starting from the sequent calculus for the intuitionistic propositional logic in G4ip [7] , to which we have also added rules for the "<->" relation, we obtain the following lightweight prover. We validate it first by testing it on the implicational subset, derived via the CurryHoward isomorphism [10] , then against Roy Dyckhoff's Prolog implementation 4 , working on formulas up to size 12. Finally we run it on human-made tests 5 , on which we get no errors, solving correctly 161 problems, with a 60 seconds timeout, compared with the 175 problems solved by Roy Dyckhoff's more refined, heuristics-based 400 lines prover, with the same timeout 6 .
The definition formula generator
We start with a candidate formula generator that we will constrain further to be used for generating candidate definitions of our modal operators.
Generating Operator Trees
We generate all formulas of a given size by decreasing the available size parameter at each step when nodes are added to a tree representation of a formula. Prolog's DCG mechanism is used to collect the leaves of the tree. 
Synthesizing the definitions of modal operators
As we design a generic definition discovery mechanism, we will denote generically our modal operators as follows.
-"#" for " "=necessary and "K"=known -"*" for "♦"=possible and "M"=knowable 4 https://github.com/ptarau/TypesAndProofs/blob/master/third_party/ dyckhoff_orig.pro 5 at http://iltp.de 6 https://github.com/ptarau/TypesAndProofs/blob/master/tester.pro
After the operator definitions
:-op( 500, fy, #). :-op( 500, fy, *).
we specify our generator as covering the usual binary operators and we constrain it to have at least one of the leaves of its generated trees to be a variable. Besides the false constant used to in the definition of negation we, introduce also a new constant symbol "?", assumed not to occur in the language. Its role will be left unspecified until the possible synthesized definitions will be filtered. We will constrain candidate definitions to ensure that axioms and selected theorems hold and selected non-theorems fail. Leaves will be picked from a given set. We first expand our operator definitions for the "~" negation and "*" modal operator while keeping atomic variables and the special constant false untouched. Other operators are traversed generically by using Prolog's "=.
." built-in and by recursing with expand def list on their arguments. The predicate prove with def refines our G4ip prover by first expanding the definitions extending IPC with a given candidate modality. The definition synthesizer will filter the candidate definitions provided by genDef such that the prover prove with def succeeds on all theorems and fails on all non-theorems, provided as names of the facts of arity 1 containing them. 
Discovering the embedding of IEL and Dosen's double negation modality in IPC
We specify a given logic (e.g., IEL or S4) by stating theorems on which the prover extended with the synthetic definition should succeed and non-theorems on which it should fail.
The discovery mechanism for IEL
We start with the 4 axioms of Artemov and Protopopescu's IEL system:
iel_th(a -> # a). iel_th(# (a->b)->(# a-> # b)). iel_th(# p <-> # # p). iel_th(# a ->~~a).
We add some theorems, intuitively relevant and/or mentioned in [4] .
iel_th(# (a & b) <-> (# a & # b)). iel_th(~# false). iel_th(~(# a &~a)). iel_th(~a ->~# a). iel_th(~~(# a -> a)). iel_th(# a & # (a->b) -> # b). iel_th(* (a & b) <-> (* a & * b)). iel_th(# a -> * a). iel_th(# a v # b -> # (a v b) ). iel_th(* a <-> * * a). iel_th(a -> *a).
Again, following [4] , we add our non-theorems.
iel_nth(# a -> a). iel_nth(# (a v b) -> # a v # b). iel_nth(# a). iel_nth(~(# a)). iel_nth(# false). iel_nth(# a). iel_nth(~(# a)). iel_nth(* false).
We also define (implicit) facts for supporting the necessitation rule that states that the operator "#" applied to proven theorems or axioms generates new theorems.
iel_nec_th(T):-iel_th(T). iel_nec_th(# T):-iel_th(T).
Finally, we obtain the discovery algorithm for IEL formula definitions and for IEL extended with the necessitation rule. backtrack_over(Goal):-call(Goal),fail;true.
println(T):-numbervars(T,0,_),writeln(T).
We run iel discover, ready to see the surviving definition candidates.
Example 1 Definition discovery without the necessitation rule. Unsurprisingly, the results are the same, as a consequence of A -> #A. Clearly, the formula #A:-(A->false)->A is not interesting as it would define knowing something as a contradiction that implies itself.
This brings us to the second definition formula candidate.
Eliminating Dosen's double negation modality
In [2] double negation in IPC is interpreted as a " " modality. This corresponds to one of the synthetic definitions #A :-(A->false)->false that is equivalent in IPC to #A :-~~A. It is argued in [4] that it does not make sense as an epistemic modality, mostly because it would entail that all classical theorems are known intuitionistically. We eliminate it by requiring the collapsing of "*" into "#" to be a non-theorem:
iel_nth(* a <-> # a).
In fact, while known (#) implies knowable (#), it is reasonable to think, as in most modal logics, that the inverse implication does not hold. After that, we have:
The double negation modality is eliminated, as it collapses # and *.
?-iel_discover. #A:-(A -> ?)->A true.
?-iel_nec_discover. #A:-(A -> ?)->A true.
Knowledge as awareness?
This leaves us with the #A :-(A -> ?) -> A.
Among the consequences of the fact that intuitionistic provability is stronger than classical, is that it there's plenty of room left between p and~~p. And it is there where both # and * find their place, given that the following implication chain holds.
p -> #p -> *p ->~~p
Let us now find an (arguably) intuitive meaning for the "?" constant in the definition. The interpretation of knowledge as awareness about truth goes back to [11] . Our final definition of intuitionistic epistemic modality as "#A :-(A -> ?) -> A" suggests interpreting "?" as awareness of an agent entailed by (a proof of) A. With this in mind, one obtains an embedding of IEL in IPC via the extension
where eureka is a new symbol not occurring in the language 7 .
In line with the Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov (BHK) interpretation of intuitionistic proof, we may say that an agent knows A iff A is validated by a proof of A that induces awareness of the agent about it.
Thus knowledge of an agent, in this sense, collects facts that are proven constructively in a way that is "understood" by the agent. The consequence KA → ¬¬A would then simply say that intuitionistic truths, that the agent is aware of, are also classically valid.
Thus, we can define our prover for IEL as follows.
iel_prove(P):-prove_with_def((#A :-(A -> eureka) -> A),P).
Interestingly, if one allows eureka to occur in the formulas of the language given as input to the prover, then it becomes (the unique) value for which we have equivalence between being known and having a proof.
?-iel_prove(#eureka <-> eureka). true .
Similarly, it would also follow that iel_prove(*eureka <->~~eureka).
Thus, one would need to forbid accepting it as part of the prover's language to closely follow the intended semantics of IEL.
6 Discovering an embedding of S4 without the necessitation rule
The fact that both IPC and S4 are known to be PSPACE-complete [12] means that polynomial-time translations exist between them.
In fact, Gödel's translation from IPC to S4 (by prefixing each subformula with the operator) shows that the embedding of IPC into S4 can be achieved quite easily, by using purely syntactic means. However, the (very) few papers attempting the inverse translation [13, 14] rely on methods often involving intricate semantic constructions.
We will use our definition generator to identify the problem that precludes a simple embedding of S4 into IPC.
We start with the axioms of S4.
s4_th(# a -> a). s4_th(# (a->b) -> (# a -> # b))
. s4_th(# a <-> # # a). s4_th(* * a <-> * a).
We add a few theorems. We add some non-theorems that ensure additional filtering.
s4_nth(# a). s4_nth(~(# a)). s4_nth(# false). s4_nth(* false). s4_nth(* a -> # * a). s4_nth(a -> # a). s4_nth(* a -> a). s4_nth(# a <-> ?). s4_nth(* a <-> ?).
Like in the case of IEL we define implicit facts stating that the necessitation rule holds.
s4_nec_th(T):-s4_th(T). s4_nec_th(# T):-s4_th(T).
Finally we implement the definition discovery predicates and run them. ?-s4_nec_discover. true.
Among them, one might want to pick #A :-? & A as an approximation of the S4 " " operator. In this case "?" would simply state that "the IPC prover is sound and complete". Still, given the failure of the necessitation rule, the resulting logic is missing a key aspect of the intended meaning of S4-provability.
Discussion
As the IPC fragment with two variables, implication and negation has exactly 518 equivalence classes of formulas [15, 16] , one would expect the construction deriving "*" from "#" to reach a fixpoint. We can use our prover to find out when that happens.
?-iel_prove(#p <->~# (~p)). false. iel_prove(*p <->~(*(~p))). true.
Thus the fixpoint of the construction is "*" that we have interpreted as meaning that a proposition is knowable. Therefore, the equivalence reads reasonably that something is knowable if and only if its negation is not knowable. Note also that
by contrast to the equivalence p ≡ ¬♦¬p usual in classical modal logics.
Related work
Program synthesis techniques have been around in logic programming with the advent of Inductive Logic Programming [17] , but the idea of learning Prolog programs from positive and negative examples goes back to [18] . Our definition synthesizer fits in this paradigm, with focus on the use of a theorem prover of a decidable logic (IPC) filtering formulas provided by a definition generator through theorems as positive examples and non-theorems as negative examples. The idea to use the new constant "?" in our synthesizer is inspired by a proofs that some fragments of IPC reduced to two variables have a (small) finite number of equivalence classes [15, 16] as well as by the introduction of new variables, in work on polynomial embeddings of S4 into IPC [13, 14] . We refer to [4] for a thorough discussion of the merits of IEL compared to classical epistemic logics following closely classical modal logic, but the central idea about using intuitionistic logic is that of belief and knowledge as the product of verification. Our embedding of IEL in IPC can be seen as a simplified view of this process through a generic "awareness of an agent" concept in line with [11] .
By contrast to "alethic inspired" epistemic logics postulating Kp → p we closely follow the p → Kp view on which [4] is centered. While we have eliminated Dosen's double negation modality [5] as an epistemic operator Kp ≡ ¬¬p , it is significant that it came out as the only other meaningful candidate produced by our definition synthesizer. This suggest that it might be worth investigating further how relevant a similar definition would be in logics with multiple negation operators like ASP. In [1] the concept of epistemic specifications is introduced that support expressing knowledge and belief in an Answer Set Programming framework. Interestingly, refinements of this work like [19] and [3] discuss difficulties related to expressing an assumption like p → Kp in terms of ASP-based epistemic operators.
Arguably, the jury is still out on deciding if classical logic, an intermediate logic like ASP or, at the limit, intuitionistic logic itself, can provide the best framework for expressing the intricate nuances of reasoning about knowledge and beliefs.
Conclusions
We have devised a general mechanism for synthesizing definitions that extend a given logic system endowed with a theorem prover. The set of of theorems on which the extended prover should succeed and a the set of non-theorems on which it should fail, can be seen as a declarative specification of the extended system. Success of the approach on embedding the IEL system in IPC and failure on trying to embed S4 has revealed the individual role of the axioms, theorems and rules that specify a given logic system. Given its generality, our definition generation technique can can be applied also to epistemic or modal logic axiom systems to find out if they have interesting embeddings in ASP and superintuitionistic logics for which high quality solvers or theorem provers exist.
